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Abstract
With the recent advances in computer networking applications, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are widely used to detect the
malicious connections in computer networks. IDS provide a high level security between organizations while preventing misuses
and intrusions in data communication through internet or any other network. Adherence to network usage policies is crucial since a
system or network administrator needs to be informed whether the information is compromised, if the resources are appropriately
used or if an attacker exploits a comprised service. Server ﬂow authentication via protocol detection analyzes penetrations to
a communication network. Generally, port numbers in the packet headers are used to detect the protocols. However, it is easy
to re-map port numbers via proxies and changing the port number via compromised host services. Using port numbers may be
misleading for a system administrator to understand the natural ﬂow of communications through network. It is also diﬃcult to
understand the user behavior when the traﬃc is encrypted since there is only packet level information to be considered. In this
paper, we present a novel approach via Hidden Markov Models to detect user behavior in network traﬃc. We perform the detection
process on timing measures of packets. The results are promising and we obtained classiﬁcation accuracies between %70 and
%100.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Server ﬂow authentication is important to understand if a service is compromised or not in a system. In this
paper, we try to solve the server ﬂow authentication problem. The question is to detect the TCP application protocol
information of a stream of data ﬂowing in a system. In this way, the system administrator can analyze the resource
utilization of the system, compromised services and unauthorized access to resources. The classical way is to inspect
the source destination port mappings of client and server. Some of the well-known protocols like DNS uses port 53
and http uses port 80. Port label and traﬃc type relation is a common asset for intrusion detection1,2. Diﬀerent attack
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scenarios may eliminate the usage of port numbers for protocol detection. As an example, proxies can be used to
bypass network policies4.
Proxy converts the port numbers of the garbage packets to valid port numbers. Thus, the system policies are in-
vaded. Similarly, compromised services place a back door for the intruder to access control over the system resources.
As an example ssh port can be compromised and the compromised service can redirect the packet to another port in
case of connection failure. The attacker knows this property and arranges the functionality of the binary in order to
use it both with ssh and other service. There are also some client installed programs working as a back door in the
system. These are installed via peer to peer programs, viruses or trojans. It is diﬃcult to understand the traﬃc if
user installed applications are working as trojans or worms. In all of these scenarios, port numbers fail to detect the
existence of a threat. The identiﬁcation of the protocols might clarify the authentication of the server ﬂows for all of
these scenarios. Several studies were proposed for the detection of unauthorized services. File system integrity and
intrusion evidences are checked by methods like Tripware6 and Chkrootkit 5. These tools suﬀer in terms of conﬁgura-
tion diﬃculties. Moreover, the systems that these tools are working might be compromised. In that case, the reports
of these tools are doubtful. Malicious software such as user installed malware may lead an unauthorized access to a
computer and hide programs, processes, ﬁles etc. from the operating system. Some third party audit software might
also be used to detect these misleading situation. However, there is still a risk that the server ﬂows are not analyzed
correctly. A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) is a Markov process with some hidden states. It is the simplest form of
a dynamic Bayesian Network7,8, 9, 10, 11. In traditional discrete and continuous Markov chains, all the states and state
transition values are observable. However, in a hidden markov model, the state is not observable but the output is
observable. There is a hidden model behind the visible layer. The model is hidden even if some of the parameters of
the model are visible. HMMs are widely used especially in speech recognition21, gesture recognition23, recognition
of hand written texts22 and bio informatics24.
In this paper, we propose a new model based on HMMs to understand the anomalies in the network traﬃc and
to detect whether there is a compromised service in the system or not. Section 2 presents the related work on the
intrusion detection systems. Section 3 proposes our HMM for server ﬂow authentication. Section 4 discusses our
experimental results and ﬁnally on Section 5 we provide our concluding remarks and future work.
2. Related Work
Intrusion Detection is suggested as an approach to prevent unauthorized access to a system12. Most of the intrusion
detection systems are not such dynamic to overwhelm misuses and anomalies. A system, program or person who
tries to get unauthorized access to some system resources or who tries to break down system functionality is called
an intruder13. Intrusion Detection Systems(IDS) try to detect the attempts to break down the system integrity and
privacy, anomalies and unauthorized access to system resources14. IDS provides reports on system activity to help
system administrators to understand abnormal situations.
Even though the genetic algorithms are mostly used in optimization problems15, they also have application areas
in intrusion detection. Crosbie and Spaﬀord16 are the frontiers of genetic programming based approaches in intrusion
detection. In their approach, they train diﬀerent agents for each parameter to observe. Finally, these agents commu-
nicate with each other to detect intrusions. This approach has the problem of time consumption due to the improper
initialization of agents. Goyal and Kumar17 proposed a GA which can successfully classify smurf attack with high
detection rates. HMMs18 are used to detect misuses and anomalies20, 27. HMM provides great success however it is
computationally expensive. HMM is used in speech, text and image recognition21, 22, 23 and bio informatics24. Com-
plex internet attacks25, 26 are shown to be detected by non-probabilistic machine learning algorithms. Our approach
diﬀers from these applications in a way that it is one of the ﬁrst approaches analyzing server ﬂows to detect protocol
information. In our approach, we try to detect protocol level information from time stamps of packets. There are some
previous approaches to detect anomalies from server ﬂows by decision trees27.
If the server ﬂows are encrypted, payload information of the packets are not suﬃcient. Packet header and traﬃc
characteristics are processed to create a feature set. Several observations are made by previous works28. As an
example, they claim that http packets contain psh ﬂags rarely while telnet packets contain more often. Our approach
is more diﬀerent. We suggest to extract protocol information from information like packet sizes and time to transmit
a packet.
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Fig. 2. Histogram for login Protocol Frequencies
3. Hidden Markov Models for Server Flow Authentication
In this section, we explain our proposed HMM model and its implementation over training and test data. Wide
Area Network Traﬃc Dataset of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory31 is used in our experiments.
Algorithm 1 Clustering Algorithm Used To Train Hidden Markov Model
Read training data
centroidListALL = {}
MeanValues = {}
for each protocol pi in the list do
centroidList←− k-means algorithm(pi)
centroidListALL←− centroidListALL ∪ centroidList
calculate mean value mi for value distribution of pi
MeanValues←− mi
end for
Train HMM with MeanValues and centroidListALL.
We performed our experiments speciﬁcally on two type of features. These are the packet transmission duration
and packet size. We ﬁrst modelled a training data consisting of smtp, telnet, nntp, domain and login records. We
used the k-means algorithm to cluster data and for each of the n protocols, k centroid values are found as stated in
Algorithm 10.
Our System consists of 5 Markov Models for each protocol. Each of the protocols are represented by two states.
These are the small packet and large packet states. Each state has n × k inner states representing a packet to be in each
cluster. We categorized the packets as small or large with respect to their packet sizes. If a packet’s size is larger than
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the mean of all training packets for a protocol, it is stated as large. Otherwise, it is a small packet. Figure 6 shows
how each HMM is constructed.
4. Experiments and Results
In our experiments, we trained 5 Hidden Markov Models for each protocol. We used 25000 telnet, smtp, nntp,
domain records and 5000 login records. We used two parameters: packet size and packet duration. We ﬁrst analyzed
the training data. We used k-means clustering and divided each training set to 9 clusters. For 5 protocols, 9 × 5 = 45
clusters are selected. We separated each group of packets as small and large packets. The states of the model represent
whether a packet is small or large. Finally, 5 HMMs with two states and 45 clusters exist. Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3,
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Fig. 6. Hidden Markov Model of Our Approach.
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show histograms for respective protocol data. We trained our HMM model with sequences
of 100 packets. We provide an iteration number of 100 for Baum Welch Learner in our tests. We trained the HMM
with test data ﬁrst. Initial probabilities of the states are assumed to be equal. After having trained the HMMs the
classiﬁcation part of our algorithm looks at the packet sizes and the corresponding packet duration probabilities for
each interval of respective protocols. If there are more than one protocol satisfying the criteria, the protocol with the
highest probability corresponding to the duration interval is selected.
Table 1. Confusion Matrix
Domain Login Smtp Nntp Telnet
Domain 24134 0 2 1071 0
Login 121 51771 468 12387 5613
Smtp 3589 677 92706 22567 12344
Nntp 866 8546 1275 60643 16662
Telnet 64 478 125 655 3490
Table 2. Detection Rates
Protocol Total Records Detected Correctly Detected(%)
Domain 25207 24134 95.75
Login 70360 51771 73.6
Smtp 131883 92706 70.3
Nntp 87922 60643 69
Telnet 4812 3490 72.5
We used duration and packet size parameters to detect protocols. These parameters were not successful to detect
protocols exactly because some protocols dominate others in speciﬁc regions. Moreover, they can be transmitted for
a long time interval overlapping with other protocols. Table 1 shows the confusion matrix and Table 2 shows the
detection rates. The results are promising and an overall detection rate over %70 is provided.
5. Conclusion
Our approach worked in high accuracy for the detection of protocols. Most of the time, training HMMs may
be problematic since there is not always enough information. Rare data problems may arise and HMMs may be
trained unbalanced. We tried to train the models equally except login protocol. User behaviour needs to be modelled
with more parameters than duration and packet size. Clustering the data in more than two dimensions may cause
memorization of the cases for HMM. Our approach focuses on network based intrusion detection. Another alternative
may be to detect intrusions computer based. Diﬀerent threads may be used to detect ip based packet ﬂows. This
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approach needs support by system administrator because users may change ip numbers if shut down happens in a
period of time and restart later. System administrator may assign static ip numbers to each computer to pursue this
case. Our approach is only restricted to protocol detection via information level data. Multistage attack patterns
can also be detected with HMMs and multiple training methods can be developed for paralelizing HMM training
procedure.
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